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"lost On The Couch" - The Psychological Reasons For Us Defeat In Iraq
By Stephen J. Morgan
“Lost on a Couch” – psychological reasons for the US defeat in Iraq
In many ways the decisive factors, which have lost the war in Iraq, are the moral and psychological questions. How long will US troops go on fighting for empty rhetoric and broken promises? How long can they continue to swear allegiance to the lies and deception of their Commander in Chief? How long can they keep up a fight without a meaning or cause, in order to justify such suffering and death? How long can they face an enemy, who, repugnant though it may seem, harbours no doubts about the justice of his cause and commands the decisive high ground in terms of psychological morale and his twisted sense of moral superiority. Crazy as it appears, in the political mayhem and sadistic barbarism of Baghdad, their foe knows exactly what he is fighting for and why.
When faced with an enemy's fanatical self-belief and the opposition to their own presence by the majority of the population, the modern soldier's appetite for fighting for the ideals of “freedom and democracy” can't linger very long. This is especially so, when Iraqis seem to no longer care about it and support for the war in the US has evaporated.
In truth, within a very short period of time, the war's moral foundations and potential for victory were already undone, when it became clear that it was based on barefaced lies and deception. It is crucial to the morale of fighting soldiers that they can look up to their Commander-in Chief as a man of integrity. Instead, once the weapons of mass destruction were never found and Hussein’s links to Al Qaeda disproved, the soldiers were left fighting for a liar and a cheat. Furthermore, as it became increasingly clearer that they were unwelcome on Iraqi soil and that the vision of “freedom and democracy” withered away, just for what and for whom they were laying down their lives. Crumbling support back home, all added together to create a sense of meaningless and futility to their involvement. With it, the prospect of winning became increasingly untenable, the sectarian strife unbearable and the demands on their physical commitment unsupportable. St. Thomas Aquinas made the famous point that “For a war to be just three conditions are necessary - public authority, just cause, right motive.” Clearly, the war was exposed as having none of the three, and demoralization began to reach such levels that even commanders in the field began warning publicly that the US Army was at “breaking point.”
The insurgents, who on paper are no match for the world’s greatest super power, began to grow in morale partly for the very same reasons that the Americans’ morale was deteriorating. Moreover, the insurgents viewed their cause, as being morally superior to their enemy's, be it with regards to an American or Iraqi foe. Insurgents of whatever hue are fighting for their right to self-determination, to national liberation, for the defence of their religion, sect, ethnic minority or cult-like, messianic ideology. In the sphere of psychological combat this gives them a colossal advantage. « In war, » as Napoleon Bonaparte once said, « the moral is to the physical as four is to one. »
However, morals are always a question of the psychological angle and perspective from which one views them. It may be repugnant to suggest that terrorist, torturers and supporters of dictatorship have the moral high ground, but that is the reality of the “moral” dynamic in this war and this is the crucial reason why they cannot be beaten by the Americans. The insurgents are fighting for causes that are both concrete and visionary. While, on the other hand, if one asks the average American soldier what he is fighting for, the overwhelming reply will be for “his buddies, «his unit. » The concepts of a war to establish a stable, democratic and prosperous Iraq, friendly to the West are no longer seriously entertained. Fighting in such a situation isn't sustainable for any length of time. And senior Pentagon military advisors, like Andrew Krepinevich, have warned that the Army might not be able outlast the insurgency. That clear goals are crucial was echoed the Head of Staff, General Peter Schoomaker, who warned that we “should surge without a purpose. And that purpose should be measurable.” On the psychological timeline, the advantage evidently lays with the insurgents.
In general, be it the Sunni insurgents, al Qaeda or the Iraqi Mehdi Army they combine military know-how, terrorist expertise and guerrilla ingenuity with determination and tenacity. They are “superior” fighters to the Americans not because they are better trained or of higher calibre in any form, but because they are fuelled by blind fanaticism, hatred, feelings of injustice, revengefulness and bloodthirstiness. Characteristics that reach barbaric levels of savagery and make them a fierce and formidable enemy. They are unhampered by convention and unrestricted by law or censure. Nor are they affected by international public opinion or the need to be seen to act justly. They view themselves as the victims, with unlimited rights of retribution. They “moral-less” and yet “morale-ly” stronger than their American opponents.
To boot, as a “movement” they are contradictory, often counterpoised and still highly effective. They are as smart as a foxes, stubborn as hyenas, patient as vultures, and as swift as a scorpion. They are courageous and cowardly, wild and yet disciplined, they are dynamic and quick-witted. They are paradoxical and disordered and, yet, they thrive upon chaos and complexity.
This is the reason why the current 2007 offensive to retake Baghdad was doomed to failure from the start. In reality, the US is just repeating the same thing failed tactic with more people and hoping that the logic of numbers will somehow smother the insurgents asymmetrical strategies. Essentially, they are stuck in a mode of urban combat that stems from 2nd World war thinking and practice. They are applying the same strategy and tactics to an urban guerrilla-terrorist force, as they would to a traditional army in any metropolitan setting. Yet to their amazement and annoyance, the enemy refuses to fight in the same way in the same way. It won’t react, it won’t fight back as it should, it won’t surrender in the same ways, and, worse still, it just retreats unperturbed and then it keeps coming back! And still the US Chiefs of Staff (or at lest many of them) are bewildered by the fact that they have to start all over again!
The Army, along with the Church, is traditionally the most conservative of institutions in society. Its
conservatism is necessary for it brings consistency, discipline, reliability and loyalty. But, unfortunately, it also means an almost organic incapacity to make fundamental changes in modes of thinking and modes of behaviour. The Iraqi guerrillas’ real trump card is the innate, wooden thinking and cognitive rigidity of the American military command. As the “surge” shows, when it comes to innovative strategies for effective counter-insurgency, they are bankrupt. This is the key answer to the bedevilling question of just why is it that the most powerful army the world is unable to defeat a force sometimes less well equipped than the Russian mafia. In asymmetrical war, suppleness and agility of the mind, is to fanaticism and visceral belligerency, as a hundred is to one. Herein lies the reason why the US Army is impotent against a foe that is its logical inferior.
So what can they do? Ah! Fight fire with fire! Use the same successful tactics of the enemy against the enemy in order to defeat them? But is the US Army going to set off roadside bombs, take sniper shots at an invisible enemy, and put adverts in the Washington Post for suicide bombers? The discussion becomes so ludicrous so quickly, it speaks for itself. The fact is, militarily they cannot win. Or rather they cannot win militarily for reasons of asymmetrical morals and psychology.
In military terms, a more effective attack upon the enemy would be to substitute the current approach for a “scorched-earth” policy, depriving the insurgents of anything to actually fight from or come back to. If the Americans raised Baghdad to the ground (and in fact necessarily all other urban centres – villages included), then any guerrillas left would have to fight them by conventional methods in desert combat. The US wins hands down.
But that, too, holds no guarantee of success in the long term. Why? Because, even the desert recovers. People come back, grass grows, buildings re-arise and weeds flourish with a double vengeance. And, unless the entire socio-political situation is changed, the Americans have to start all over again with a new counter-insurgency. Again the discussion becomes ludicrous. However ruthless the Americans are, the terrorists would pursue their same favourite policy. Faced with a « scorched earth » policy they would just move to another country, until the conditions were right to return. Jihad would be exported and then re-imported, as they have done in Afghanistan.
Similar types of approach have a debacle for Israel. Despite have ethnically cleaned and driven 700,000 Arabs out of Israel, they are still fighting them 60 years on. The last 6-year urban guerrilla insurgency of the Palestinian intifada should serve as an example of how the world most experienced counter-insurgency army has totally failed. Moreover, its ignominious and humiliating defeat in Lebanon should compound that lesson, as yet another fresh reminder of what can happen, when the an inferior military force like Hezbollah has the balance of moral and psychological forces weighted decisively in its favour.
Perhaps the only psychological factor that could now tip the balance towards the Americans would be at least « being wanted ». And they most certainly aren’t! Despite some reluctant support in some sections of the older Sunni population, and despite some measure of hostility or antipathy toward the insurgents, the majority of people oppose the US presence and also have little confidence in either the Iraqi national government, Army or police. At the same time, there is sufficient, substantial support and toleration of the militias and insurgents by the population for them to thrive. The difference between and the few successful counter-insurgency wars there have been - such as Malaysia and Indonesia- is largely due to the fact that, there, despite much opposition, the national government and army, plus the foreign troops, had, at least, some important basis of support within the population, especially in urban areas. And even then they supported one ethnic group against another. Something the US is trying to do with the Shias, but is failing because of the opposition and threats of powerful, friendly Sunni regimes across the Middle East.
Consequently, there isn't sufficient positive support for the US to win and there is quite enough for the insurgents to be able to function very effectively. That is why they are able to return to areas that have been cleared or withdrawn from. Moreover, when the US troops get as far as clearing an area and handing it over to the Iraqi Army, they can’t hold it for the same reason- the Iraqi lack sufficient public support and firepower. Moreover, if the US cannot defeat the insurgents with all its military might, then, obviously, the poorly trained and equipped Iraqi troops stand no chance. The attitude towards them by locals will be exactly the same as it is to the Americans – “for God’s sake get out of here, your making matters worse!” And there is real truth in that.
The reasons for the military failure in exists on many levels, and not just militarily. Strategic and tactical matters are inextricably interlinked with moral and psychological issues. Many other factors, such as the mode of thinking in the White House and the Pentagon, the opinion changes among the people of and in the US, plus world opinion, in general, all play an important roles. The fact that the situation changed so dramatically within three years belies how complex the interaction of these factors are. Complexity is not something which conservative thought deals with easily, both for the military and the political leadership of a country. And if that is not enough, the next thing which conservative thought finds most bewildering and abhorrent is chaos – complexity and chaos, precisely the two phenomena the current US conservative leadership has run out of real options for dealing with.
Stephen Morgan 15/01/07
http://morgansreview.tripod.com/ Article Directory: http://www.articlecube.com Stephen John Morgan is a former member of the British Labour Party Exectutive Committee. He is a political psychologist, researcher into Chaos/Complexity Theory and lives in Brussels (Old Europe) stephenjmorgan.tripod.com Contact morganreply@yahoo.com
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